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SC EPTIC ISM , N U M BER AN D APPEARAN C ES : 
The ἀριθμητικὴ  τέχνη  and Sextus ’ targets in M I-VI 
Lorenzo CORTI 
Archives Henri Poincaré (Nancy) 
RÉSUMÉ. Cet article s’interroge sur ce qu’est l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη visée par 
Sextus dans le Contre les arithméticiens. Après avoir rappelé brièvement le contenu 
de M IV, on examine la nature de cette discipline. Une fois clarifiée la question de 
savoir en quoi consistait l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη dans l’Antiquité – et donc ce que visait 
Sextus dans M IV –, on examine son rapport avec les autres disciplines critiquées 
par Sextus dans le Contre les Professeurs. Cette enquête mène à mettre en lumière 
une importante présupposition implicite dans l’attitude de Sextus à l’égard des 
sciences. 
SUMMARY. This paper is devoted to Sextus’ target in Against the Arithme-
ticians: the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη. After a brief sketch of M IV’s content, we make an 
inquiry on the nature of such a discipline. Firstly we tackle the general question of 
what was the ἀριθμητική τέχνη in Antiquity. Once we are clearer on that – and thus 
on Sextus’ target in M IV, we explore its relationship to the other disciplines attacked 
by Sextus in his Against the Professors. This ultimately leads us to shed light on an 
important implicit assumption of Sextus’ attitude towards the sciences. 

  
1. Exordium: M IV in the context of M I-VI 
The subject of this presentation will be Sextus Empiricus’ treatise 
Against the Arithmeticians. This treatise belongs to one of the three sur-
viving works of Sextus, i.e. M I-VI, often called Against the Professors. M I-
VI is usually characterized as Sextus’ most mature work. In PH and in M 
VII-XI, Sextus provides a sceptical attack on the three constituent parts of 
philosophy – logic, physics and ethics, and recommends suspension of jud-
gement over every object of inquiry. In M I-VI, by contrast, the targets are 
more specific: Sextus trains his fire on alleged sciences or branches of pu-
tative knowledge (μαθήματα), and the scepticism he encourages often seems 
to be moderate – or rational – in its scope and nature.  
M I-VI is structured in three main parts. After a proem (I 1-8) the work 
divides into two parts: first, a brief general discussion (M I 9-40) and then a 
particular treatment of individual sciences. In the particular treatment Sex-
tus deals with six μαθήματα: with grammar in M I, with rhetoric in M II, 
with geometry in M III, with arithmetic in M IV, with astronomy in M V 
and with music in M VI. The topics discussed by Sextus in M I-VI cons-
tituted a set of liberal arts or τέχναι which later formed the trivium and the 
quadrivium. This set included also logic or dialectic, which Sextus does not 
discuss in Against the Professors because – it has been argued – he has al-
ready dealt with it as one of the three parts of philosophy.1  
Against the Arithmeticians is articulated in three parts. In the first one 
(IV 1) Sextus distinguishes two kinds of quantity, namely magnitude and 
number, which are the subject respectively of geometry and arithmetic, and 
he announces his aim: to destroy number and to show that the art which is 
constructed to handle it does not exist. In the second part (IV 2-10) Sextus 
sketches the ‘Pythagorean’ philosophy of number, which is a system based 
on two principles: the One and the Dyad. In the third part (IV 10-34) 
!
1. See Barnes 1988, 56-57; on the relationship between the set of disciplines attacked by 
Sextus and those forming the trivium and the quadrivium see Spinelli 2010, 249-252, with 
references. 
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Sextus objects in various ways to the principles of this system, i.e. to the 
Platonic notions of the One (11-20) and of the Dyad (21-2); and finally he 
puts forward arguments of an entirely abstract nature against the intel-
ligibility of subtraction and addition (23-34).  
Sextus’s objection against the notion of the One is constituted by two 
parts. First of all Sextus presents two characterizations of the One which he 
ascribes to Plato:  
– ‘One is that without which nothing is called one’; 
– ‘One is that by participation in which each thing is called both one 
and many’.2  
The two characterizations are followed by an argument in their sup-
port, which aims to show that the One cannot be one of the things which 
are called one, but must be something different from them, in which they 
participate. Sextus, then, puts forward two objections against this con-
ception. The first can be sketched as follows: either the idea of One is dif-
ferent from the particular numerables, or it is conceived along with those 
things which participate in it; but both possibilities lead to difficulties. The 
second objection argues that, given the idea of the One, by participation in 
which a thing is called one, either there is one such idea, or there are many 
ideas of the One. But both possibilities lead to difficulties. As far as the Pla-
tonic notion of the Dyad is concerned, Sextus, after having stressed that 
this concept is subject to an aporia which Plato himself recognized 
(Phaedo, 96e-97a) concludes that the Dyad is nothing; and therefore num-
ber is nothing.3 I will not give the details of Sextus’ two arguments against 
the intelligibility of subtraction and addition.4 It is worth observing, 
though, that those arguments have the aim of showing that the dogmatic 
conception of number is incoherent:  
!
2. Sextus Empiricus, M IV 10: Τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τοίνυν νόησιν διατυπῶν ἡμῖν πυθαγορικώτερον 
ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν ‘ἕν ἐστιν οὗ μηδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἕν‘ ἢ ‘οὗ μετοχῇ ἕκαστον ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ λέ-
γεται‘. For the passages from M I-VI I use the translation by Bury, sometimes slightly mo-
dified. 
3. For an analysis of Sextus’ attack on the Dyad and its Platonic background see Cor-
ti forthcoming. 
4. An analysis of these arguments (and of the whole M IV) will be provided in Sextus 
Empiricus. Against the Arithmeticians, introduction, translation and commentary by Corti 
forthcoming. 
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If number is conceived as subsisting through addition, as I said, and sub-
traction, and we have shown that neither of these exist, one must declare 
that number is nothing.5 
A couple of points are worth emphasising. Sextus’ criticism is not ad-
dressed against the ordinary arithmetic, the fact of counting or calculating. 
Indeed, in a parallel passage Sextus seems to accept such activities:  
So far as ordinary custom goes, we speak, without holding opinions, of 
numbering things and we accept that there are such things as numbers. But 
the superfluities of the Dogmatists have provoked an argument against 
number too.6 
Sextus’ criticism is rather addressed to the use of arithmetic made by a 
specific philosophical school. Despite the fact that he calls his adversaries 
‘Pythagoreans’, Sextus’ target does not seem to be Pythagoras, but rather 
philosophers who, using some texts by Plato and his immediate successors 
in the Old Academy, have developed a doctrine of the incorporeal – and of 
number in particular.7 It should be stressed that Sextus, in the parallel 
passage PH III 156, ascribes to the Pythagoreans the same argument which 
he ascribes to Plato in M IV 11-13 – an argument which aims to show that 
number is something different (has an independent existence) from the 
numerables. 
In order to get clearer on Sextus’ target let us go back to the beginning 
of Against the Arithmeticians:  
!
5. Sextus Empiricus, M IV 34: ᾽Ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ὁ ἀριθμὸς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὡς ἔφην, καὶ κατ’ 
ἀφαίρεσιν ὑφιστάμενος νοεῖται, ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὐθέτερόν ἐστι τούτων, ῥητέον μηδὲν εἶναι 
ἀριθμόν. 
6. Sextus Empiricus, PH III 151: ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τι 
φαμὲν καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκί-
νηκε λόγον. Translation by Annas and Barnes 1994. 
7. The point was made by Burkert 1972, 53-83. In addition to M IV 2-10, Sextus pro-
vides what he presents as a Pythagorean doctrine devoted to numbers in three other loci: PH 
III 151-6 and M X 248-84, which are subsequently attacked (in PH III 156-67 and M X 
284-309 respectively), and M VII 92-109. Sextus’ four accounts were considered among the 
most important later sources for Pythagoreanism, along with the Pythagorean Com-
mentaries excerpted by Alexander Polyhistor (contained in DL VIII), the Life of Pythagoras 
excerpted by Photius and the reports of the doxographer Aëtius. All these sources ascribe to 
the Pythagoreans a doctrine characterised by two principles, the One and the Dyad, and a 
system in which the geometrical items (the point, the line, the surface and the solid) are 
somehow derived from the first four numbers. Burkert persuasively argued that the doctrine 
of the Two Principles and of the Derivation System is not a Pythagorean doctrine, held by 
Pythagoras or one of his followers, but an achievement of Plato and the Academy, which 
had its origin in Plato’s Timaeus and unwritten doctrines, and the works of his pupils Speu-
sippus and Xenocrates. Cf. infra, n. 23 p. 134. 
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Since one kind of quantity, which is called ‘magnitude’, and which is the 
chief concern of geometry, belongs to continuous bodies, and another 
kind, which is number, the subject of the arithmetical [art], belongs to dis-
continuous things, let us pass on from the principles and theorems of geo-
metry and examine also those which deal with number; for if this is 
destroyed, the art which is constructed to handle it will not exist.8 
The scenario is the following. There are two kinds of items: the con-
tinuous (συνεχῆ) – the bodies; and the discontinuous (διεστῶτα). And there 
are two kinds of quantity (ποσόν): the first is called ‘magnitude’ (μέγεθος), 
and it belongs to continuous items. And the second is called ‘number’ (ἀρι-
θμός), and it belongs to discontinuous items. The first kind of quantity, 
magnitude, is the subject of geometry. The second kind of quantity, 
number, is the subject of the arithmetical art.  
Now Sextus, in M IV, wants to destroy number, and show that the 
arithmetical art (ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη) does not exist. But what is the discipline 
which Sextus attacks? The question needs to be answered: surely what he is 
attacking in IV 2-34 must be the thing he describes in IV 1. And that’s 
what he calls ἀριθμητική or ‘arithmetic’, as the scholars usually translate;9 
but of course, this is not the sort of thing we learn in primary schools, 
which ‘4 x 7 = 28’ is a theorem of.  
2. ᾽Αριθμητικὴ τέχνη  
If we want to grasp what is the discipline attacked by Sextus in M IV we 
have first of all to get clearer on what was the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη in Anti-
quity. We may distinguish several approaches to arithmetic in ancient 
times. The first is represented by books VII, VIII and IX of Euclid’s Ele-
ments, the so called ‘arithmetical books’, which constitute the only Greek 
document preserved devoted to the theory of numbers and proceeding in a 
demonstrative way. A second approach is constituted by the metaphysical 
and mathematical account of numbers contained in texts by neo-Pytha-
gorean or Platonist authors. We may mention here Nichomachus of Ge-
rasa (1st-2nd century AD) and his Introduction to Arithmetic; the com-
mentaries on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic – in particular, that 
by Iamblichus of Chalcis (3rd-4th century AD) which, despite its traditional 
title, is rather a treatise on numbers based on the Introduction than a com-
!
8. Sextus Empiricus, M IV 1: ᾽Ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχέσι σώμασιν, ὃ δὴ 
μέγεθος καλεῖται, περὶ ὅ ἐστι μάλιστα ἡ γεωμετρία, τὸ δὲ ἐν διεστῶσιν, ὅπερ ἀριθμὸς καθέστηκεν, 
περὶ ὃν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καταγίνεται, σκοπῶμεν ἀπὸ τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε ἀρχῶν καὶ θεωρημάτων 
μετελθόντες καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐδ’ ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν συνισταμένη γενή-
σεται τέχνη. 
9. Cf. Bury 1933: ‘arithmetic’; Delattre (in Pellegrin 2002): ‘arithmétique’. 
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mentary on it;10 and also the arithmetical sections of the Mathematics 
Useful for Understanding Plato by Theon of Smyrna (2nd century AD). In 
some parts of the works of Theon and Iamblichus just mentioned we find, 
in addition to the account of the metaphysical and mathematical pro-
perties of number, a description of alleged mystic or symbolic properties of 
the first ten numbers.11 Nicomachus himself indulged in these arith-
mological ponderings, not in his Introduction but in a lost writing called 
Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικῆς. Parts of the compilation which has come to us 
under that title, was edited by Ast and used to be ascribed to Iamblichus, 
may derive from Nicomachus’ lost work.12 A third and different approach 
is represented by the ᾽Αριθμητικά by Diophantus of Alexandria, an alge-
braic work of crucial importance for the history of the discipline. This is a 
collection of one hundred and thirty problems giving numerical solutions 
for determinate equations (those with a unique solution), and inde-
terminate equations.13 
Let us focus in particular on the first two approaches, starting from Eu-
clid’s arithmetical books. These are constituted by a set of twenty-two 
Definitions of terms, followed by three sets of Propositions, i.e. truths 
about the things denoted by the terms just defined: theorems. The Defi-
nitions and the Propositions concern the properties of and relationships 
between two items: (i) unit; and (ii) numbers. Let us consider an example 
of Euclid’s modus operandi: his definitions of unit, number and numbers 
prime to one another on one side, and Proposition I on the other:  
Df. 1. A unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called 
one. Df. 2. A number is a multitude composed of units… Df. 12. Numbers 
prime to one another are those which are measured by some number as 
common measure… 
Proposition I. Two unequal numbers being set out, and the smaller being 
continually subtracted in turn from the greater, if the number which is left 
never measures the one before it until a unit is left, the original numbers 
will be prime to one another.14 
!
10. Cf. the remarks by Robbins 1926, 126. 
11. Cf. e.g. Iamblichus, in Nic. 11.1-26; Theon, Expositio, 94.1-106.11. I owe both the 
point and the references to Vitrac 1990-2001 (vol. 2, 474). 
12. Cf. Heath 1921, vol. 1, 97. For a sketch of Nicomachus’ arithmological approach 
and its antecedents see the remarks of Robbins 1926, p. 89-92; the same approach is to be 
found in Anatolius of Alexandria. 
13. Cf. O’Connor & Robertson 1999. 
14. Euclid, Elements, VII: Μονάς ἐστιν, καθ’ ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται. ᾽Ἀριθμὸς δὲ 
τὸ ἐκ μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος… Πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί εἰσιν οἱ μονάδι μόνῃ μετρού-
μενοι κοινῷ μέτρῳ… Δύο ἀριθμῶν ἀνίσων ἐκκειμένων, ἀνθυφαιρουμένου δὲ ἀεὶ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἀπὸ 
 Lorenzo Corti 128 
Two things are worth noting. First: the content of the arithmetical 
books, as the content of the other books of the Elements, is characterised by 
a deductive structure: the Propositions are derived from the Definitions by 
way of deductions. Given the definitions of unit, number, and numbers 
prime to one another – given what a unit, a number and the relationship 
being prime to one another amount to, it follows that Proposition I is true.15 
Second: there is no metaphysics in Euclid’s text. Euclid does not deal with 
the question of what it is for a number to exist: he just assumes that it 
exists.16  
Let us now consider the second approach to arithmetic distinguished 
above; and let us deal, in particular, with Nicomachus’ Introduction to 
Arithmetic. This treatise, as its title suggests, is an introduction to a dis-
!
τοῦ μείζονος, ἐὰν ὁ λειπόμενος μηδέποτε καταμετρῇ τὸν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἕως οὗ λειφθῇ μονάς, οἱ ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς ἀριθμοὶ πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔσονται. Translation Heath 1926, slightly modified. 
15. And indeed in Euclid’s text Proposition I is followed by its proof: Δύο γὰρ [ἀνίσων] 
ἀριθμῶν τῶν ΑΒ, ΓΔ ἀνθυφαιρουμένου ἀεὶ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος ὁ λειπόμενος μηδέ-
ποτε καταμετρείτω τὸν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἕως οὗ λειφθῇ μονάς· λέγω, ὅτι οἱ ΑΒ, ΓΔ πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλή-
λους εἰσίν, τουτέστιν ὅτι τοὺς ΑΒ, ΓΔ μονὰς μόνη μετρεῖ. Εἰ γὰρ μή εἰσιν οἱ ΑΒ, ΓΔ πρῶτοι πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους, μετρήσει τις αὐτοὺς ἀριθμός. Μετρείτω, καὶ ἔστω ὁ Ε· καὶ ὁ μὲν ΓΔ τὸν ΒΖ μετρῶν λει-
πέτω ἑαυτοῦ ἐλάσσονα τὸν ΖΑ, ὁ δὲ ΑΖ τὸν ΔΗ μετρῶν λειπέτω ἑαυτοῦ ἐλάσσονα τὸν ΗΓ, ὁ δὲ 
ΗΓ τὸν ΖΘ μετρῶν λειπέτω μονάδα τὴν ΘΑ. ᾽Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ Ε τὸν ΓΔ μετρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ΓΔ τὸν ΒΖ 
μετρεῖ καὶ ὁ Ε ἄρα τὸν ΒΖ μετρεῖ· μετρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅλον τὸν ΒΑ· καὶ λοιπὸν ἄρα τὸν ΑΖ μετρήσει. ὁ 
δὲ ΑΖ τὸν ΔΗ μετρεῖ· καὶ ὁ Ε ἄρα τὸν ΔΗ μετρεῖ· μετρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅλον τὸν ΔΓ· καὶ λοιπὸν ἄρα τὸν 
ΓΗ μετρήσει. ῾Ο δὲ ΓΗ τὸν ΖΘ μετρεῖ· καὶ ὁ Ε ἄρα τὸν ΖΘ μετρεῖ· μετρεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅλον τὸν ΖΑ· 
καὶ λοιπὴν ἄρα τὴν ΑΘ μονάδα μετρήσει ἀριθμὸς ὤν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. Οὐκ ἄρα τοὺς ΑΒ, 
ΓΔ ἀριθμοὺς μετρήσει τις ἀριθμός· οἱ ΑΒ, ΓΔ ἄρα πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰσίν· ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι. 
16. But doesn’t Euclid at least appear to take one of the two main metaphysical lines on 
numbers drawn in Antiquity? The Platonists argued that numbers exist independently from 
countable items; the Aristotelians claimed that the existence of the former amounts to that 
of the latter. To put the point linguistically, number words have an adjectival (‘One leg is 
good, two legs is better’) and a substantival (‘Two is twice one’) use. It is the substantival use 
of number words – the one we adopt when we do arithmetic – which insinuates that num-
bers have a separate existence from countable items. One way to neutralise the point and 
argue for the Aristotelian position is to suggest that the substantival use is parasitical upon 
the adjectival use – i.e., roughly, that the meaning of the substantive ‘two’ is to be explained 
by reference to the meaning of ‘two Fs’ (see Barnes 1995, 87). Now Euclid defines ‘unit’ – 
i.e. the things arithmeticians refer to when they say that 10 contains 3 more units than 7 – 
in terms of ‘one’, the ordinary adjective we use in answering e.g. the question: ‘How many 
legs did Long John Silver have?’; and insofar as he takes the substantive ‘unit’ to derive from 
the corresponding adjective, one might think that he is implicitly taking an Aristotelian line 
(rather than a Platonist line) on the metaphysical question of what it is, for a number, to 
exist. This is a tempting thought; but the temptation is appeased by the fact that Euclid’s 
definition of ‘unit’ (Μονάς ἐστιν, καθ’ ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται) is actually quite close 
to the definition of ‘one’ which Sextus ascribes to Plato (ἕν ἐστιν οὗ μηδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἕν). 
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cipline: the arithmetical art. The discipline is characterized at the begin-
ning of the treatise in contrast with other sciences, on the basis of a dis-
tinction between beings:  
Beings, then, both those properly so called and those so called by homo-
nymy (that is, both the objects of thought and the objects of perception), 
are some of them unified and continuous, for example, an animal, the 
universe, a tree, and the like, which are properly and peculiarly called ‘ma-
gnitudes’; others are discontinuous, in a side-by-side arrangement, and, as it 
were, in heaps, which are called ‘multitudes’, a flock, for instance, a people, 
a heap, a chorus, and the like. Wisdom, then, must be considered to be the 
science of these two forms [i.e. magnitude and multitude]. 
Nicomachus then specifies that the science in question cannot be a 
science of magnitude and multitude per se, but of something separated 
from each of them: of quantity, set off from multitude; and of size, set off 
from magnitude. He concludes that  
since of quantity one kind is viewed by itself, having no relation to any-
thing else, as ‘even’, ‘odd’… and the other is relative to something else and is 
conceived of together with its relationship to another thing, like ‘double’, 
‘greater’, ‘smaller’… it is clear that two sciences will lay hold of and deal 
with the whole investigation of quantity: the arithmetical art, absolute 
quantity; and music, relative quantity.17 
He then distinguishes between two sciences which deal with size: geometry 
on one side, and astronomy on the other. 
Let us focus on the crucial steps of Nicomachus’ presentation. There 
are two kinds of beings (ὄντα): the properly-called beings (i.e. the objects of 
thought: νοητά), and the beings by homonymy (i.e. the objects of per-
ception: αἰσθητά). In both cases we can distinguish further between beings 
which are unified and continuous (ἡνωμένα καὶ ἀλληλουχούμενα), e.g. the 
living, the world, the tree, which are called magnitudes (μεγέθη); and beings 
which are divided and juxtaposed and as in heaps (τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα τε καὶ ἐν 
παραθέσει καὶ οἷον κατὰ σωρείαν), which are called multiplicities (πλήθη), 
!
17. Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic I.2.4-3.1: Τῶν τοίνυν ὄντων τῶν τε 
κυρίως καὶ τῶν καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν, τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα καὶ ἀλ-
ληλουχούμενα, οἷον ζῶον, κόσμος, δένδρον καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, ἅπερ κυρίως καὶ ἰδίως καλεῖται μεγέθη, 
τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα τε καὶ ἐν παραθέσει καὶ οἷον κατὰ σωρείαν, ἃ καλεῖται πλήθη, οἷον ποίμνη, δῆμος, 
σωρός, χορὸς καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Τῶν ἄρα δύο εἰδῶν τούτων ἐπιστήμην νομιστέον τὴν σοφίαν... 
Πάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ὁρᾶται καθ’ ἑαυτό, μηδεμίαν πρὸς ἄλλο σχέσιν ἔχον, οἷον 
ἄρτιον, περιττόν... τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο πως ἤδη ἔχον καὶ σὺν τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει ἐπινοούμενον, οἷον 
διπλάσιον, μεῖζον, ἔλαττον... δῆλον ὅτι ἄρα δύο μέθοδοι ἐπιλήψονται ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ διευ-
κρινήσουσι πᾶν τὸ περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ σκέμμα, ἀριθμητικὴ μὲν τὸ περὶ τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτό, μουσικὴ δὲ τὸ 
περὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἄλλο. Translation by D’Ooge 1926, slightly modified. 
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e.g. a flock, a people, a chorus. We have then the distinction of four 
sciences: two of them, the arithmetical art and the musical art, deal with 
two different aspects of the first kind of beings – multitudes; and the other 
two, geometry and astronomy, with two different aspects of the second 
kind of beings – magnitudes.  
Nicomachus’ presentation of the arithmetical art reminds us of Sextus’ 
presentation of this discipline in M IV 1. Mutatis mutandis, both in Nico-
machus and Sextus the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη is presented in contrast with other 
mathematical disciplines, on the basis of a distinction between continuous 
items – magnitudes – and discontinuous items – multiplicities. To say it 
with Sextus, the subject of geometry is a kind of continuous quantity: 
magnitude; and the subject of the arithmetical art is a kind of discon-
tinuous quantity: number. The origin of this distinction is a passage of the 
Categories, 4b20-5a14, where Aristotle distinguishes between continuous 
and discontinuous quantities. Without pursuing this subject in depth here, 
we might follow the approach of White 1992 and sketch the Aristotelian 
characterization of continuous quantities as follows. If a quantity is conti-
nuous, then it can be divided in a certain way – in parts of a certain kind; if 
a quantity is discontinuous, then it can be divided in another way – in parts 
of another kind. More specifically, what is continuous cannot be divided 
into parts which are both jointly exhaustive (i.e. such that no part of the 
original whole is left out) and mutually disjoint (i.e. such that none of them 
overlaps any other); what is discrete or discontinuous can be divided into 
parts so characterized.  
Nicomachus’ Introduction is articulated in four parts, each dedicated to 
one of four fundamental themes concerning numbers. For every theme 
Nicomachus puts forward a classification of concepts constituted by a set 
of Definitions, followed by examples. The classifications are the following: 
(i) the classification of numbers considered in themselves, starting from the 
fundamental opposition even vs. odd, and of the species which those two 
genera split into; (ii) the classification of the numerical ratios, according to 
the ten categories of the relative quantity; (iii) the classification of the fi-
gured numbers; (iv) the account of the theory of the ten proportions, which 
extends beyond arithmetic, but which is treated here, because it constitutes 
a subject preliminary to the ensemble of the mathematical studies.18 
But here we are concerned more with the kind of discipline Nico-
machus deals with rather than with the technical details of his study. Nico-
machus’ arithmetical art is devoted to a certain kind of being: number. It is, 
in this sense, a metaphysical discipline: it deals with number qua being. It 
!
18. I owe this sketch of the structure of the ‘Introduction’ to Vitrac 1990-2001 (vol. 2, 
475). 
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copes with the question of what it is, for number, to exist (Nicomachus of 
course takes a Platonist line on the matter: number has an existence 
independent from numerables); and with the question if there is any kind 
of item whose existence depends on that of number, and any kind of item 
whose existence the existence of number depends on.  
This as far as the subject matter of the arithmetical art is concerned; but 
what about its structure? In his introduction to the more recent French 
translation of Euclid’s Elements, Caveing observes that  
the Euclidean form is the demonstrative form which puts forward the rea-
sons why the results of a science are necessarily true: it is distinct from 
other forms of expositions, which we have also specimens of – e.g. Nico-
machus’ Introduction to arithmetic, in which these reasons are not given, 
but the results are commented on from other points of view.19 
In the same work Vitrac, after having made a comparison between Euclid’s 
and Nicomachus’ classification of even and odd number, emphasizes the 
very strict deductive structure which characterizes Euclid’s sequence and is 
absent in Nicomachus’ one, and explains this fact by suggesting that  
the human intervention implied by a demonstration would risk making the 
reader believe in a conventional character of arithmetic’s results. But these 
results, from Nicomachus’ point of view, are an objective reality inde-
pendent of our grasp of it, which it is right to describe, not to justify.20  
Be that as it may, these judgments stress an unquestionable feature of 
Nicomachus’ arithmetical art: it is a discipline, a sequence of propositions, 
characterized by a non-deductive structure.21  
Thus, the expression ἀριθμητικὴ (τέχνη) in Antiquity may be used to 
refer, in particular, to two quite different (kinds of) disciplines. The first 
one is the number theory we find in Euclid, Elements, VII, VIII and IX. It 
is a discipline devoted to unit and number. It has not got an explicitly 
metaphysical content (i.e. it does not explicitly discuss the question of/try 
to establish what it is for a number to exist). Like the discipline treated in 
Elements, I-VI, X-XIII, i.e. geometry, this discipline has a deductive struc-
ture. Its constituents divide into two classes: the first truths or principles 
(definitions, postulates or axioms), and the derived truths or theorems. Its 
!
19. Op. cit. vol. 1, 114. The translation is mine. 
20. Op. cit. vol. 1, 114. The translation is mine. 
21. Cf. also Heath 1921, vol. 1, 97-98: ‘It is a very far cry from Euclid to Nicomachus. In 
the Introductio arithmetica… there are no longer any proofs in the proper sense of the word: 
when a general proposition has been enunciated, Nicomachus regards it as sufficient to 
show that it is true in particular instances; sometimes we are left to infer the general pro-
position by induction from particular cases which are alone given’. 
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principles do not need proof: they are primary and self-explanatory. Its 
theorems are proved from its principles: the proofs, which must take the 
form of valid deductive arguments, explain the theorems and ground our 
knowledge of them on our knowledge of the principles. So Euclid’s number 
theory has a finite and unitary set of principles, and it constitutes a closed 
body of explained or self-explanatory truths.  
But ἀριθμητικὴ (τέχνη) in Antiquity may also be used to refer to a se-
cond kind of discipline: the discipline e.g. Nicomachus’ Introduction to 
Arithmetic is devoted to, which we may call arithmetical art. This discipline 
also deals with the particular kind of discontinuous quantity Euclid’s num-
ber theory deals with: number. But it differs from it at least in two respects. 
First: it considers a certain aspect of number – it deals with number qua 
being. In other words, Nicomachus’ arithmetical art has a metaphysical 
subject. It is a discipline devoted to beings; and in particular, to those kinds 
of beings which are numbers – to the question of what it means, for a 
number, to exist; and (e.g.) to the question if there is any item whose exis-
tence depends on that of numbers. Second: Nicomachus’ arithmetical art is 
not a deductive science; it has rather an expository character. It contains no 
demonstration; it is a set/a sequence of propositions which does not satisfy 
any of the defining-conditions of a demonstrative science. 
3. Sextus’ targets in M I-VI 
Now given those two different disciplines, which of them is attacked in 
Against the Arithmeticians? The answer is clear: Sextus, in M IV, does not 
attack people like Euclid (and a discipline like the subject of his arith-
metical books);22 he rather attacks people like Nicomachus (and a disci-
pline like the subject of his Introduction to Arithmetic).23 And this is an in-
teresting fact, particularly if we consider it in the light of what Sextus does 
in the preceding essay, Against the Geometers.  
In this treatise, coherently with the general strategy he adopts in M I-
VI, Sextus wants to show that geometry is not really an art, since it has no 
!
22. Least of all does Sextus attack people like Diophantus and works like his algebraic 
treatise. 
23. And also people like Theon, and Platonist or Neo-Pythagorean versions of the ἀρι-
θμητική which accounted for mystic and symbolic features of numbers in addition to their 
mathematical and metaphysical properties. As Brisson observes, ‘Sextus’ systematic demo-
lition calls into question anything which could be taught by the Neo-Pythagoreans in the 
first centuries of our era’, and that is ‘a theoretical context in which naturally converge Py-
thagoreanism and Platonism, just as it was the case in the Ancient Academy of Speusippus 
and Xenocrates and in the middle Platonism’ (Brisson 2006, 70). The translation and the 
italics are mine. 
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object. He starts by attacking the procedure of the geometers (and others) 
of ‘postulating their geometrical first principles by hypothesis’24 (7-17). 
Sextus indicates that his targets are the ὑποθέσεις understood in a specific 
sense, according to which ‘we call hypotheses the first principles of proofs: 
for an hypothesis is the postulating of a fact for the establishing of 
something’ (III 4); he then attacks the reasonableness of accepting any such 
first principle (7-17).25 He subsequently tries to show the falsity, in-
consistency and unacceptability of some of the principles of geometry in 
particular (18). Sextus attacks first the definitions of fundamental notions 
such as point, line, surface and body (19-93), and then derived notions 
such as straight line, angle and circle (94-107). Sextus’ purpose is to show 
that the objects of the alleged geometrical truths are inconceivable. Some of 
his arguments concern the relation between geometrical objects of di-
mension n (lines, surfaces, solids) and objects of dimension n-1 (points, 
lines, surfaces); others directly attack definitions, for instance on the 
grounds that there is some incoherence in them.26 In a final section (108-
116), Sextus trains his fire on the theorems or derived truths of geometry – 
in particular, on the possibility of bisecting a given straight line.  
The exact origin of Sextus’ arguments and the identity of his adversaries 
have been debated.27 It appears that he targets a pretty elementary geometry 
!
24. Sextus, M III 1: ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αἰτεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς. The translation of 
the passages from M III is by Barnes 1990a, 95. 
25. Sextus Empiricus, M III 4: κατὰ τρίτην ἐπιβολὴν ὑπόθεσιν καλοῦμεν ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως, 
αἴτησιν οὖσαν πράγματος εἰς κατασκευήν τινος. As Barnes 1990a, 90-96 has shown, Sextus’ 
targets here are the hypotheses in a broad Aristotelian sense – the first or primary or pri-
mitive principles from which the remaining truths or theorems of a science are derived. Sex-
tus has in mind a method of proof which begins by someone laying down certain pro-
positions as first principles, an act which commits him to their truth and constitutes the 
starting point in the demonstration of a theorem. Sextus rightly supposes that this method 
is not peculiar to geometers, but common to anyone supposing that all knowledge depends 
on some principles; thus, before raising specific difficulties against some geometrical prin-
ciples, he attacks the reasonableness of accepting any principle by means of the hypothetical 
mode (for a sharp analysis of Sextus’ attack, see Barnes 1990a, 96-112). 
26. Cf. Mueller 1982, 71-72. 
27. What are Sextus’ sources and who does he aims his refutations at? Sextus mentions 
no geometer but Eratosthenes (M III 28) and no title of geometrical treatise. As Dye and 
Vitrac 2009, 168 point out, Heiberg, the modern editor of Euclid, uses Sextus as a witness 
of the Euclidean tradition for Definitions I.2, 4, 8, 15 and Proposition I.10, which he would 
mention in M III 29, 94, 100, 107 and 109. Heiberg believes that Sextus read the Elements 
(and that he had a correct text in comparison to that of Iamblichus: cf. Heiberg 1969-1977 
vol. 4, LXXII); he is followed by Heath (1926, 62-63). This position is nuanced by Mueller 
1982. He takes Sextus’ target to be ‘Euclidean geometry’: if it is clear that Sextus puts 
forward and attacks (among other things) variants of Euclid’s definitions of line, surface, 
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which was taught in some philosophical (presumably Platonist) schools, 
rather than the advanced science of Euclidean geometry. Still, this geo-
metrical discipline appears to be on the same wave length as Euclidean 
geometry in at least two respects: first, it is characterized by a deductive 
structure; and second, it does not have an explicitly metaphysical content. 
Now in M IV, as we have just seen, Sextus does not attack a discipline on 
the same wave-length as Euclidean geometry, such as the subject of Euclid’s 
Elements VII, VIII and IX would have been. In other words, Sextus’ targets 
in M III and in M IV are not homogenous.  
The scenario we find in M IV, Against the Arithmeticians, is similar to 
the scenario we find in M V, Against the Astrologers. At the beginning of 
this treatise (V 1-3) Sextus clarifies the object of his inquiry: the astrology 
or the mathematical art. This is not the complete art composed by the 
arithmetical art and geometry – indeed, Sextus has already confuted the 
professors of these subjects. It is not the capacity of predicting (προρρητική 
δύναμις) practised by Eudoxus and Hipparchus either – for this capacity, 
like agriculture and navigation, consists in the observation of the things 
which appear, from which it is possible to forecast draughts, and rain-
storms and plagues and earthquakes and other changes in the surrounding 
vault of a similar character. Sextus’ target is rather constituted by the horos-
copes of the Chaldeans, which are opposed to ordinary life, build a great 
bulwark of superstition and do not allow us to do anything according to 
the right reason.28 
!
body, straight line and circle, the provenance of Sextus’ targets and arguments is not 
immediately obvious: and Mueller stresses the relationship between some of them and Stoic 
and Epicurean philosophizing. Cambiano 1999 adds further details: he suggests that Sextus’ 
targets were likely to include, in addition to geometers such as Euclid and Heron, some 
philosophers, presumably Stoics, who took the definitions of some fundamental notions 
such as point, line and solid as relevant to philosophy. As for his arguments, Cambiano finds 
it likely that Sextus drew both from the Epicureans and the Academics. Most recently, Dye 
and Vitrac 2009 argue that Sextus’ attack on the foundations of geometry does not aim at 
refuting the sophisticated presentations of this discipline offered by Euclid, Archimedes, 
Apollonius, Pappus or Eutocius, but rather the use of geometry made by mathematicians 
and philosophers to modelize the physical world along the lines of Plato’s Timaeus. 
According to Dye and Vitrac, such technical geometrical treatises by Euclid and his 
colleagues as the Elements were used in the framework of a specialized education, while 
other more elementary writings, geometrical introductions, were used in a cycle of 
mathematical studies propaedeutic to philosophy imparted in some philosophical schools. 
The existence of these geometrical elementary handbooks is suggested by Nicomachus 
himself (who in his Introduction to Arithmetic II.6.1 mentions an Introduction to geometry: 
cf. Heath 1921, vol. 1, 97), but none of them has survived. 
28. Sextus Empiricus, M V 1-3: Περὶ ἀστρολογίας ἢ μαθηματικῆς πρόκειται ζητῆσαι οὔτε 
τῆς τελείου ἐξ ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας συνεστώσης (ἀντειρήκαμεν γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τούτων 
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Sextus’ target, here, has nothing to do with a deductive science – 
mathematical astronomy; it is constituted by the pseudo-science of astro-
logy. What about the second discipline which Sextus distinguishes astro-
logy from, and does not attack? Sextus mentions, among its heroes, 
Eudoxus.29 In astronomy Eudoxus was the first Greek to construct a mathe-
matical system, that of the homocentric spheres, to explain the apparent 
motions of the heavenly bodies. The system is described by Simplicius (in 
Cael. 492.31 ff.). But Eudoxus was also famous for his more practical and 
very influential description of the constellations, with calendaric notices of 
risings and settings, which appeared in two versions, the ῎Ἔνοπτρον and the 
Φαινόμενα. The latter is known through its adaptation by Aratus in his very 
popular poem of the same name. The commentary of Hipparchus on both 
Eudoxus and Aratus is extant.  
The second discipline mentioned by Sextus should not be identified 
with Eudoxus’ mathematical astronomy,30 but rather with his work on 
constellations. Sextus does not attack it on the ground that it amounts to 
an observation of the things which appear (like farming and navigation) by 
means of which weather can be predicted. But is Sextus justified in des-
cribing Eudoxus’ astronomy in these terms? Barnes expresses some doubts:  
the description is scarcely true to the historical achievements of Eudoxus, 
whose aim is nothing if not theoretical; but Sextus is determined to cons-
true his work as nothing more than the observation of phenomena…31 
This latter point needs to be emphasized. In a couple of treatises of M I-
VI Sextus puts forward a contrast between a practical art on one side, which 
he accepts and does not attack, and a theoretical counterpart of it on the 
other, which he aims to refute. At the beginning of Against the Gram-
marians Sextus remarks that the term γραμματική is ambiguous: it may 
mean the art of reading and writing (τέχνη τοῦ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν: cf. 
M I 49), normally called γραμματιστική, and it may mean the technical dis-
!
τῶν μαθημάτων) οὔτε τῆς παρὰ τοῖς περὶ Εὔδοξον καὶ ῾Ἵππαρχον καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους προρρητικῆς 
δυνάμεως, ἣν δὴ καὶ ἀστρονομίαν τινὲς καλοῦσι (τήρησις γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ φαινομένοις ὡς γεωργία 
καὶ κυβερνητική, ἀφ’ ἧς ἔστιν αὐχμούς τε καὶ ἐπομβρίας λοιμούς τε καὶ σεισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλας τοιου-
τώδεις τοῦ περιέχοντος μεταβολὰς προθεσπίζειν), ἀλλὰ πρὸς γενεθλιαλογίαν, ἣν σεμνοτέροις κοσ-
μοῦντες ὀνόμασιν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι μαθηματικοὺς καὶ ἀστρολόγους σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναγορεύουσιν, ποι-
κίλως μὲν ἐπηρεάζοντες τῷ βίῳ, μεγάλην δ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιτειχίζοντες δεισιδαιμονίαν, μηδὲν δὲ ἐπιτρέ-
ποντες κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἐνεργεῖν. 
29. I owe the account of Eudoxus which follows to Toomer & Jones 20124, 546. 
30. Which Sextus does not discuss ‘perhaps because of its reliance on the methods of 
arithmetic and geometry, but perhaps because he has no particular objections to raise 
against it’ (Mueller 2004, 63). 
31. Barnes 1988, 71. 
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cipline developed by the scientific grammarians, which amounts to the 
knowledge of letters in their more varied and expert theorems (ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν 
τοῖς ποικιλοτέροις αὐτῶν καὶ τεχνικωτέροις θεωρήμασι γνῶσις: cf. M I 46). 
Sextus then explains that it is not his plan to speak against the former, but 
against the latter (I 49).  
A distinction similar to that of grammatistic vs. grammar is to be found 
at the beginning of Against the Musicians. The term ‘music’ is used in dif-
ferent senses:  
in one as a science dealing with melodies and notes and rhythm-making 
and similar things… in another sense it connotes instrumental skills, as 
when we describe those who use flutes and harps as musicians and female 
harp players as musicians… While music, then, is conceived in all these 
ways, it is certainly not our present purpose to frame our refutation of it if 
conceived in any other sense than the first signified.32  
Here Sextus distinguishes between musical theory (ἐπιστήμη τις περὶ με-
λῳδίας καὶ φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοποιίας) and musical skills (ἡ περὶ ὀργανικὴν ἐμ-
πειρία), and resolves to attack only the former. 
In order to understand the contrast between practical and theoretical 
arts at stake in those passages, let us go back to Against the Grammarians. 
The grammarians offered, by their art, a criterion for discriminating good 
Greek from bad. In their opinion, in order to speak good Greek the speaker 
must possess the grammatical art: he must know a set of theorems which 
enables him to determine, between two alternative expressions, which of 
them is correct. Here is an example put forward by Sextus in M I 197. We 
have to establish which of two expressions, χρᾶσθαι or χρῆσθαι, is well said. 
The Grammarians answer: χρᾶσθαι. Why? Because (i) χρῆσις and κτῆσις are 
analogous; (ii) κτᾶσθαι, and not κτῆσθαι, is well said; therefore (iii) χρᾶσθαι, 
not χρῆσθαι, is well said.33 The underlying idea is that if two substantives 
(χρῆσις and κτῆσις) are analogous – i.e. they have the same ending, then the 
derived verbs are analogous – and therefore they have the same ending. 
Sextus rejects any such technical criterion:  
!
32. Sextus Empiricus, M VI 1-3: ῾Ἡ μουσικὴ λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ’ ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐπιστήμη 
τις περὶ μελῳδίας καὶ φθόγγους καὶ ῥυθμοποιίας καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια καταγιγνομένη πράγματα, 
καθὸ καὶ ᾽Ἀριστόξενον τὸν Σπινθάρου λέγομεν εἶναι μουσικόν, καθ’ἕτερον δὲ ἡ περὶ ὀργανικὴν 
ἐμπειρία, ὡς ὅταν τοὺς μὲν αὐλοῖς καὶ ψαλτηρίοις χρωμένους μουσικοὺς ὀνομάζωμεν... ἀλλὰ δὴ 
κατὰ τοσούτους τρόπους νοουμένης τῆς μουσικῆς, πρόκειται νῦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίρρησιν οὐ μὰ 
Δία πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ἢ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον νοουμένην σημαινόμενον... 
33. Sextus Empiricus, M I 197: ζητουμένου γὰρ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν, χρῆσθαι ἢ χρᾶσθαι, 
φασὶν ὅτι χρᾶσθαι, καὶ ἀπαιτούμενοι τούτου τὴν πίστιν λέγουσιν, ὅτι χρῆσις καὶ κτῆσις ἀνάλογά 
ἐστιν· ὡς οὖν κτᾶσθαι μὲν λέγεται, κτῆσθαι δὲ οὐ λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ χρᾶσθαι μὲν ῥηθήσεται, χρῆσ-
θαι δὲ οὐ πάντως. 
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The criterion of what is well said and what is not will be not some technical 
theory of grammar but the non-technical and informal observation of 
usage.34  
Those who want to speak correctly should attend to the non-technical and 
informal observation… of the usage of most people and of what they accept 
as Greek or reject as not Greek.35  
The key words here are παρατήρησις, observation and συνήθεια, com-
mon usage. Instead of technical theory, Sextus suggests, let us stand by un-
tutored observation. Let us observe ordinary usage, see what usages people 
accept and what they reject, and take this as a criterion of correctness.36  
Now it is reasonable to imagine that what is said of the theoretical art of 
grammar and the practical art of grammatistic in M I is a special case of 
what could be said throughout M I-VI about the theoretical sciences 
attacked by Sextus on one hand and their corresponding practical coun-
terparts accepted by him on the other. In order to complete our sketch of 
such a contrast, one last detail must be added. In characterizing some of the 
practical arts he does not attack, Sextus makes reference to τὰ φαινόμενα, 
the things which appear. We have seen that Sextus describes the good as-
tronomy of Eudoxus as ‘observation of the things which appear’. That this 
description is true to the historical achievements of Eudoxus is ques-
tionable, as we have seen; still, it gives us a clue of what the science of as-
tronomy should amount to in order to be acceptable for a sceptic. It should 
be nothing more than the observation of phenomena, similar to the ob-
servation of common usage. A good grammarian does not theorize about 
language: he reports common usage. A good astronomer does not theorize 
about the nature of things; he observes what seems to be the case. Else-
where, Sextus puts forward a similar characterization of a sceptically accep-
table counterpart of the theoretical medicine: the good doctor is a mere 
observer and recorder of phenomena.37 The emphasis on observation and 
phenomena recalls the conception of medicine characteristic of the medical 
school to which Sextus himself is said to have belonged, medical empi-
ricism. The Empirical doctors relied on ‘experience’, or ἐμπειρία: they 
accumulated observations concerning which types of phenomenon have 
!
34. Sextus Empiricus, M I 153: γενήσεται τοῦ τε εὖ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ κριτήριον οὐχὶ τεχ-
νικός τις καὶ γραμματικὸς λόγος ἀλλ’ ἡ ἄτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις. 
35. Sextus Empiricus, M I 179: δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλομένους διαλέγεσθαι τῇ ἀτέχνῳ καὶ 
ἀφελεῖ κατὰ τὸν βίον καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν παρατηρήσει προσανέχειν. 
36. Cf. Barnes 1988, 69. For an analysis of Sextus’ invitation to stick to common usage, 
cf. Corti 2009, 206-219; for a defense of this invitation in the spirit of a Wittgensteinian 
‘use’ theory of meaning, cf. Corti 2009, 220-235. 
37. M V 103-104: cf. Barnes 1988, 71-72 on this passage. 
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tended to go with which (e.g. wounds to the heart with death), and what 
sort of intervention has been seen to help in which type of case (e.g. eating 
pomegranates in cases of diarrhoea); then they recalled these memories to 
provide the appropriate remedy (pomegranates) for a given pathological 
symptom (diarrhoea).38 So the practical counterparts of theoretical 
sciences, such as grammatistic, musical skills and medicine, are based on the 
observation (τήρησις) of the common usage (συνήθεια) and of the things 
which appear (τὰ φαινόμενα); and they do not pretend to discourse about 
nature (φύσις). But they are genuine arts: they contain universal gene-
ralisations and they exhibit a systematic structure. 
Sextus’ acceptance of the practical arts as opposed to their theoretical 
counterparts suggests that it should be possible, for a sceptic, to acquire and 
exercise them without having any beliefs. Is this a reasonable thought? 
Barnes has defended such a view in a persuasive way. He distinguishes 
between a formal and informal learning. Formal learning involves a teacher 
and a learner: the teacher has knowledge, which he articulates in a system 
of propositions; he teaches his pupil by declaring these propositions; and 
the pupil learns insofar as he thereby comes to acquire the teacher’s beliefs. 
Informal learning involves a master and an apprentice: the master possesses 
some skill, which he evinces in his practice; he teaches his apprentice by 
showing his skill; and the apprentice learns insofar as he thereby comes to 
acquire the skill which his master possesses. Formal learning involves the 
possession and transmission of beliefs. A Pyrrhonist – by definition – can-
not make judgements nor acquire beliefs; therefore he cannot formally 
learn. But informal learning invokes no beliefs; and thus, it seems perfectly 
compatible with Pyrrhonism. Pyrrhonists have capacities and practical 
skills of various sorts: they can read and write; they can play music; some of 
them can heal the sick. These capacities can be acquired by a Pyrrhonist: 
for such informal learning does not depend upon any mental attitude 
which a Pyrrhonist must lack.39 
!
38. Cf. Hankinson 1998, 308-309: ʻThe Empiricist… builds up a collection of obser-
vations where particular types of event are seen to follow one another…: if it becomes 
sufficiently large it will generate a general rule, or theorem. These theorematic relations 
between observable events need be neither universal nor positive: the Empiricists employ a 
fivefold typology of connection and disjunction, according to whether things are seen to go 
together always, for the most part, half the time, or never… These categories stand in rarely 
determinate logical relations: always p if and only if never not-p; for the most part p if and 
only if rarely not-p; half the time p if and only if half the time not-p. And all of them are of 
value in isolating appropriate therapies and rejecting others… All that matter for the Em-
piricists are the appearances, the phainomena…ʼ. 
39. Cf. Barnes 1988, 61. 
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This distinction between a practical skill which is acceptable for the 
sceptic and a corresponding theoretical science which the sceptic refuses 
and attacks, though, is not to be found uniformly in Against the Professors. 
The scenario in this work, as far as the disciplines attacked and accepted by 
Sextus are concerned, is roughly the following. In M I and M VI we have a 
contrast between a theoretical art or science which is attacked (grammar 
and musical science), and a corresponding practical art which is accepted 
(grammatistic and musical skills). In M V we find a distinction between a 
pseudo-science (astrology), which is attacked, and what is construed as a 
predictive capacity, but appears to have a theoretical aim, Eudoxus’ astro-
nomy, which is accepted. In M IV Sextus’ target is a non-deductive, meta-
physical discipline: the ʻPythagoreanʼ arithmetical art. We find no refe-
rence to a practical counterpart of the arithmetical art in this treatise; but 
in the parallel passage PH III 151 Sextus accepts the capacity of counting 
and calculating. In M III Sextus’ target is a scientific discipline displaying 
the demonstrative and non-metaphysical characteristics of Euclidean geo-
metry; and in M II rhetoric, presented as the science of speech (ἐπιστήμη 
λόγων). 
4. Scepticism, sciences and appearing 
The scenario is quite puzzling. Even if Sextus presents M I-VI as a 
unified treatise, he seems to have different ideas (and different kinds of 
target) in mind in each of them. In some treatises of M I-VI (or better: in 
some parts of M I-VI), demonstrative sciences are attacked, and the corres-
ponding practical skills are accepted. In others, pseudo-sciences are atta-
cked, and sciences which Sextus construes as practical skills are accepted. In 
others, a demonstrative science or a non-demonstrative discipline is atta-
cked, and no counterpart of it is accepted. This textual fact raises several 
questions; in the following lines I will focus in particular on one of them. 
What does Sextus have in mind in M III, where he attacks a discipline on 
the same wave length as the demonstrative science par excellence, Euclidean 
geometry, and in M V, where he construes Eudoxus’ astronomy as a prac-
tical skill and accepts it? What does make it possible, for Sextus, to 
construe Eudoxus’ astronomy as an empirical art? And why doesn’t Sextus 
accept, in some cases, non-theoretical counterparts of the disciplines he 
attacks?  
One answer can be the following. Some theories or sciences are such 
that you can master them without having any beliefs; other theories or 
sciences are such that you cannot master them without having any beliefs. 
Some theories are such that grasping their primary truths (can) amount to 
being capable of doing something; other theories are such that grasping 
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their primary truths cannot amount to being capable of doing something. 
My knowledge that ‘Ann’ designates Ann amounts to nothing but 
knowing how to use the name ‘Ann’. I grasp that ‘Ann’ designates Ann in-
sofar as I use ‘Ann’ to designate Ann and I realize that, when you utter 
‘Ann is here’, you refer to Ann – I don’t need to have any beliefs about 
what the name designates.40 But can I grasp the postulate ‘Parallel lines 
however far extended never cross’ in a similar sort of way? Mustn’t I have at 
least some beliefs (say about what parallel lines are) in order to master that 
truth? If this is the case, the fact that one can or cannot master a science 
without beliefs must depend on the nature of its primary truths.  
An important distinction might be pertinent here. Sextus often em-
ploys, sometimes confusingly, a twofold division between types of items of 
knowledge: the non-evident (ἄδηλον) and the evident (πρόδηλον/ἐναργές). 
He presents this distinction in PH II 97-98 and in M VIII 145-147. Let us 
have a look at the first of these texts, focusing in particular on the dis-
tinction between evident objects and by nature non-evident objects: 
Some objects, then, according to the Dogmatists, are evident, and some are 
non-evident. And of the non-evident, some are non-evident once and for 
all, some are non-evident for the moment, and some are non-evident by na-
ture. What comes of itself to our knowledge, they say, is evident (e.g. that it 
is day)… and what does not have a nature such as to fall under our evident 
grasp is non-evident by nature (e.g. imperceptible pores – for these are 
never apparent of themselves but would be deemed to be apprehended, if at 
all, by way of something else, e.g. by sweating or something similar)…41  
The origin and nature of this characterization have been widely dis-
cussed.42 For my present purpose, though, it will be enough to sketch the 
!
40. For this way of granting the Pyrrhonist a linguistic mastery see Corti 2009, 221-235 
and 249-259. 
41. Sextus Empiricus, PH II 97-98: Τῶν πραγμάτων τοίνυν κατὰ τοὺς δογματικοὺς τὰ μέν 
ἐστι πρόδηλα, τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ μὲν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα, τὰ 
δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα. Καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν εἶναί φασι τὰ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν εἰς γνῶσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷόν ἐστι 
τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι… φύσει δὲ ἄδηλα τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα φύσιν ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πίπτειν ἐνάργειαν, ὡς οἱ 
νοητοὶ πόροι· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐδέποτε ἐξ ἑαυτῶν φαίνονται, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα, ἐξ ἑτέρων καταλαμβάνεσθαι 
ἂν νομισθεῖεν, οἷον τῶν ἱδρώτων ἤ τινος παραπλησίου. 
42. The contrast between evident (πρόδηλα/ἐναργή) and non-evident (ἄδηλα) objects is 
an old one. Hankinson traces it back to the Hippocratic treatise On the Art, in which the 
author distinguishes between ‘open’ (φανερά) diseases, occurring on the surface of the body, 
and hidden (ἄδηλα) diseases, ‘peculiar to the bones and to the hollows of the body’: see 
Hankinson 1987a, 88 and 1987b, 331 n. 12. The distinction between different kinds of 
non-evident objects grounds that between two kinds of signs, the indicative and the com-
memorative (PH II 99-102; M VIII 148-58). Hankinson takes the former distinction to be 
Stoic (Hankinson 1987b, 338 n. 32). The latter has often been taken to be Stoic; Ebert 
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basic idea of the distinction between the by nature non-evident objects, 
and the evident objects. We might express this distinction in propositional 
terms as follows: 
– It is evident to x at t that P iff x can know that P directly at t, without 
using an inference, whether on the basis of perception or through some 
sort of intellectual intuition.  
– It is by nature non-evident to x that P iff x can know that P only by 
means of an inference – on the basis of other pieces of knowledge of his. 
For instance, it is evident to me now that it is raining: I can come to 
know that it is raining just by looking out of the window. By contrast, it is 
by nature non-evident to me that there are invisible pores in my skin. I can 
come to know that only by making an inference from another piece of 
knowledge of mine: for instance, my justified belief that I sweat. 
This distinction implies, I think, that the by nature non-evident objects 
such as the invisible pores or the soul or Providence cannot appear – they 
cannot produce any appearing. If an object appears to you to have a certain 
feature now, then you can grasp that feature of that object not by means of 
an inference. So if you can grasp the features of an object only by way of an 
inference, then it cannot do any appearing. Therefore a by nature non-
evident object cannot do any appearing. Can imperceptible pores appear 
round to me at the moment? Can your soul appear to me to be in your 
body at the moment? Can Providence appear to me to exist at the mo-
ment? The answer to these questions is, I think: No. Evident objects can 
produce appearing; by nature non-evident objects cannot do so. Now it 
seems to me that abstract numbers and abstract geometrical items (maybe 
insofar as they are abstract) are by nature non-evident items – they cannot 
do any appearing. Can the number 47 appear prime to you at the moment? 
It seems to me that nothing could count as a number’s appearing in that 
sort of way.  
The claim that only evident items can appear calls for two clarifications. 
First: it is worth distinguishing that thesis from the thesis that only per-
ceptible items can appear. Sextus – like everyone else in antiquity – presup-
poses that things may be evident to the mind as well as to the senses: so he 
surely won’t be leaning on that second thesis. Second: a distinction bet-
ween two different uses of the Greek verb φαίνεσθαι (and its English coun-
terparts ‘to appear’ or ‘to seem’) is crucial here. These verbs may be used in 
a judgmental way, to express the fact that one is inclined to judge or believe 
something (‘It seems to me that I have closed the door, but I’ll check that 
!
believes it to have ultimately originated from the ‘Dialecticians’; its paternity remains con-
troversial. For discussion (and references) see Burnyeat 1982, 212-214; Sedley 1982, 241; 
Glidden 1983, 247 n. 39; Ebert 1987, 97 n. 15. 
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again’). But they may also be used in a phenomenological way, to denote the 
fact that things look, appear in a certain way – which does not imply being 
inclined to judge or believe something (‘I have just tried your honey and it 
appears to me to be bitter, but I am not inclined to believe that it is: it may 
taste thus to me only because I am sick’). The impressions or appearances 
at stake in the sceptic texts and in the claim that only evident items can ap-
pear are psychological events of the latter kind. The claim amounts to 
saying that if x is a by nature non-evident object, then x cannot seem or ap-
pear to you to be F in the second sense of ‘appear’ distinguished above; still, 
it is perfectly possible for you to have the judgmental impression that x is F 
– that is, to be inclined to judge or believe so.43 As far as the claim goes, you 
can be inclined to believe that the number 37,491,317 is prime; but you 
cannot have the phenomenological impression that this is so. 
Thus, not every object can appear F to someone: some objects can do 
some appearing, other objects cannot do any appearing. On the basis of this 
distinction between objects we can draw a distinction between pro-
positions. Some propositions contain terms which denote things which can 
do some appearing, such as honey and wine and sticks; other propositions 
contain terms which denote objects which cannot do any appearing, such 
as numbers and imperceptible pores and points. And on the basis of these 
distinctions between objects and propositions we can draw a distinction 
between sciences or theories. Some sciences are about objects which can do 
some appearing – they are constituted by propositions which contain 
terms denoting such objects; other sciences are about objects which cannot 
do any appearing – they are constituted by propositions which contain 
terms denoting such objects.  
Now let us recall Sextus’ characterization of the practical counterparts 
to theoretical sciences accessible to the sceptic: these skills amount to the 
‘observation of things which appear’ – i.e. the observation of items which 
produce appearing. If a theoretical science deals with objects which pro-
duce some appearing, then there may be a practical counterpart to it ac-
cessible to the sceptic. Eudoxus’ astronomy deals with planets, which ap-
pear to have certain features. So we can (in principle) construe Eudoxus’ as-
tronomy as a science acceptable for the sceptic. But there are other theo-
retical sciences, such as geometry, which deal with objects that cannot do 
any appearing, like abstract points and lines: and there cannot be a practical 
counterpart to them. For, if the empirical counterpart of a theoretical 
science amounts to the observation of the things which appear, and some 
objects cannot appear, then there cannot be an empirical science of such 
!
43. For a characterization of the sceptic appearances see Frede 1973, 809-810; Barnes 
1980, 491 n. 1; Burnyeat 1979, 34-35 and 43-46; Barnes 1990b, 2623. 
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objects. So Sextus, as a sceptic, cannot accept those sciences; nor, of course, 
other non-deductive disciplines such as the arithmetical art which also 
deals with objects which cannot do any appearing: number qua being.  
If this is the case, we may manage to explain the apparent oddness of 
Sextus throughout M I-VI. When, given the nature of the science at stake, 
a practical counterpart is available, Sextus accepts it. When, given the 
nature of the science at stake, it can be construed as the observation and 
recording of phenomena, Sextus accepts it; and when, given the nature of 
the discipline at stake, it is such that there cannot be any empirical or prac#
tical counterpart to it, then Sextus does not mention – and of course he 
does not accept – any such thing. Sextus’ different attitudes result from the 
different nature of his targets, and leave his modus operandi coherent.44 
!
44. This paper is an outcome of my research project ʻScepticism, Metaphysics and 
Sciencesʼ. A first stage of the project has been funded by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation and developed at the Faculty of Classics at the University of Cambridge (PA001--
115325/1); a second stage has been funded by the EU and developed at the UMR 8546, 
ENS Paris (FP7-Marie Curie IEF-275852). The paper has particularly benefitted from re-
marks from Jonathan Barnes, Myrto Hatzimichali, Marwan Rashed, David Sedley, and an 
anonymous reviewer for Philosophie Antique. I am very grateful to them all, as well as to the 
organizers and audiences of the conferences in Buenos Aires and Paris where this work has 
been presented and discussed. 
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